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ABSTRACT
This paper provides a critical survey of the literature on politico-institutional determinants
of the government budget. We organize our discussion around two questions: Why did certain
OECD countries, but not others, accumulate large public debts? Why did these fiscal imbalances
appear in the last twenty years rather than before? We begin by discussing the "tax smoothing"
model and conclude that this approach alone cannot provide complete answers to these questions.
We will then proceed to a discussion of political economy models, which we organize in six
groups: i) Models based upon opportunistic policy makers and naive voters with "fiscal illusion";
ii) Models of intergenerational redistributions; iii) Models of debt as a strategic variable, linking
the current government with the next one; iv) Models of coalition governments; v) Models of
geographically dispersed interests; vi) Models emphasizing the effects of budgetary institutions.
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1.Introduction
Several, but not all, OECD economies have accumulated large government
debts in the last 20 years. Whydidit happen? Whycertaincountries, but
not others, have experienced large budget deficits for several years? What
explains these large cross-country differences?
Figures1 and2 highlight the dimension of this problem. Figure 1
shows the debt to CNPratiosin seven countries where this measure sharply
increased in the last twenty years. In three of these countries (Belgium,
Ireland and Italy) this ratio is beyond 100percent. Figure 2. instead,
shows the debt to CP ratio in seven countries where this measure appears
relatively stable, compared to the countries of Figure 1. The United States
is included in Figure 2, but even in this country the increase in the debt
to CNP ratio in the eighties has caused much concern. Figure 3 plots the
debt to GNP ratio of the United States: the downward trend which started at
the end of the second world war, reversed in the last decade.
The difference between the debt to CNP ratios amongst this group of
countries in the nineties is very large: from more than 100 per cent in
Belgium and Italy, to less than 30 per cent in Australia and Germany, even
leaving aside Japan.
It is difficult to explain these large cross country differences using
economic arguments alone: these countries are all advanced industrial
democracies, all members of the OECD,allat very high levels of per capita
income.We believe, instead, that politico-institutional factors are
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in general. While the economies in the OECD group of countries are
relatively similar, their institutions (such aselectorallaws, party
structure, budget laws, Central sank laws, degree of decentralization,
political stability and social polarization, etc.) are quite different.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss how the political economy
literature can answer the two crucial questions sketched above:
i)whydowe observe large and persistent deficits in peace time and why
now?
ii) why do we observe large debts in certain countries and not in others?
Any explanation that can answer the first, but not the second question is
not entirely convincing. For instance, any theory which implies that
democracies are always in fiscal deficits is incomplete if it does not
explain why certain democracies, but not others have experienced fiscal
imbalances.
Theliteratureon the political economy of fiscal policy is very large
and dates back to the nineteen century with the "Italian school" to public
finance. We do not attempt to cover systematically all of this literature;
instead we remain focused on the two questions highlighted above and we
emphasize recent research, for two reasons. First, recent contributions are
generally less well known. Second, in the last five or six years the
political economy literature has shown a renewed impetus: the new
political economy is. in fact, one of the most active fields in economics.
We begin our discussion with a review of the tax smoothing" theory of
the government budget (Barro (1979), Lucas and Stokey (1983)). This
approach serves as a normative benchmark from which political economymodels.5-
depart: in fact most of the recent political models are "positive"
explanations of observed deviations from taxsmoothing.Furthermore, the
proponents of this theory (for instance Barro (1985, 1986, 1987)) view it
not only as "normative", but also as "positlve, that is as a description of
actual fiscal policy.
We will then proceed to a discussion of political economy models, which
we organize in six groups: i) Models based upon opportunistic policy
makers and naïve voters with "fiscal illusion"; ii) Models of
intergenerational redistributions; iii) Models of debt as a strategic
variable, linking the current government with the next one; iv) Models of
distributional conflicts within social groups and/or political parties in
coalition governments; v) Models of geographically dispersed interests;
vi) Models emphasizing the effects of budgetary institutions.
Ourreviewwill be critical and opinionated: we do notbelievethat
all of these models have the same explanatory power, and we willmakeit
clear. After this review we briefly discuss the policy implications of this
research, for institutional reforms.
2.Optimal BudEetPolicy
The "taxsmoothing"theory of the government budget considers a closed
economy without capital in which a representative agent consumes, works and
saves.The government is a "benevolent social planner" who maximizes the
utility of the representative agent. Both the representative agent and the
government have the same time horizon, which, for simplicity is infinite.
The theory abstracts from intergenerational aspects and from finite terms of
office for governments..6-
Thegovernment needs to finance a certain amount of spending in every
period by means of taxes on labor income, which are distortionary sthce they
affect labor supply. The representative agent's utility function depends
upon private consumption andleisure;but not on the amount of public good,
which we can, for simplicity, define asdefensespending".lJ The crucial
result (Earro (1979), Lucas andStokey(1983)) is that the social planner
should keep the tax rate constant. The level of taxesisdetermined by the
intertemporalbudget constraint, which implies that the present value of
spending (which is exogenously given) has to be equal to the present value
of taxes. Therefore, budget deficits and surpluses areusedasabuffer;
deficits occur when spending istemporarilyhigh and surpluses when it is
low.
These results directly follow from the concavity of the individual
utility function. Suppose that government spending has to be Thigh" today
and "low tomorrow. A balanced budget policy implies high tax rates today
and low tax rates tomorrow. The tax smoothing policy, instead, prescribes
constant tax rates, a deficit today and a surplus tomorrow which (in presert
value terms) compensates for today's deficit. The second policy dominates
because the additional tax distortions today more than compensate (in
utility terms) for the welfare gains of the lower tax rates of tomorrow,due
to decreasing marginal utilities.
This simple principle has far reaching implications for fiscal policy,
which a few examples highlight.
1/Thecase in which the public goods enters in the utilityfunction of












Exanrnle 1: Suppose that government spending is constant, throughout the
planning horizon. The optimal policy prescribes a balanced budget every
period.
Examole 2: Suppose that from period zero to period t government spending is
constant, andisexpected to be constant forever. In period t an unexpected
'war3J occurs and the war' is knowntolast until period (t+n). The
optimal policy implies a balanced budget until period t, a small permanent
tax increase at t, a deficit between t and (t+n), and a surplus afterward.
Figure 4A illustrates the implications of this policy.
ExaTnole 3: Suppose that at time t government spending unexpectedly
increases forever. The optimal policy implies a balanced budget in every
period with a permanent increase in taxes at time t.
Exarnr'le 4: Suppose that at time t government spending unexpectedly
increases temporarily, then at (t+n) falls permanently below the original
level, so that in present value terms we have a reduction of the total
a.mount of spending. (That is, the permanent reduction after (t+n) more than
compensates the temporary increase). The optimal policy implies a reduction
of taxes at time t, a deficit between t and (t+n), and a surplus after
(t+n). Figure 4B illustrates.
The principle of taxsmoothingis quite clear: budget deficits and
surpluses are used optimally to minimize the distortionary effects of
taxation, given a certain path of spending.2.J
J The tern uwar is used as a short-cut for a period of temporary high
level of government spending.
21 The theorybecomesformally more complex if government spending is
sthocastic, but the basic principles of tax smoothing are unchanged (Lucas
and Stokey (1983)).-8-
An important extension of this model concerns the cyclical fluctuations
of taxrevenuesdue to the business cycle. For essentially the samereasons
discussed above, the principle of taxsmoothingimplies that tax rates
should be constant over the business cycle; therefore, one should observe
deficits during recessions compensated by surpluses in expansions.
Therefore, the case of example 1 extended to a model with cyclical
fluctuations of output, implies a cyclicallY adjusted, balance budget rule:
the budget should be balanced over the business cycle, but not every fiscal
year. In this model, there is no role for a Keynesian stabilization policy,
since output is not demand-determined. In a model with stabilization
policies, cyclical fluctuations of the budget should be even more
pronounced.
In summary, the key punch line is that budget deficits should be
observed during "wars" and recessions.
As a normative theory,thetax smoothing model is extremely valuable.
Any positivemodel of fiscal policy has to take the tax smoothing as a
benchmark. As a "positive" theory of budget deficits, this model is
insufficient to answer our two questions.
Barro (1985, 1986, 1987) has tested the tax smoothing model on two
hundred years of American and British data. Figures 3 and 5 show that
Barro's exercise is, up to a point, quite successful. Both the American and
British experiences are, broadly speaking, consistent with the basic
principles of tax smoothing: the debt to CNP ratios increase during wars,
decrease in peacetime and fluctuate with the business cycle. However, one
can identify periods in which fiscal policy appears inconsistent with thisratio  of  nominal  debt  to  nominal  GNP .9.
theory. For example, the sharpincreasein the debt/CNP ratio in the
eighties in the United States ii, at least at first sight, inconsistent with
the taxsmoothingmodel.
To be lure, the tax smoothing theory could explain even this decade
(Barro (1991)). Suppose that in the early eighties it became knownthat,
withatemporary increase in military spending, the 'cold war' could have
been won and, by the nineties, military spending could be cut below the
initial level in 1980. This is essentially the example 4 given above: the
optimal policy in this case is to cut taxes and increase military spending
in l980s, run deficits in the eighties, and surpluses in the 1990s.
This explanation is not entirely convincing because it relies too
heavily on specific assumptions about expectations held in 1980. In some
sense, infiscalpolicy can be rationalized from a tax smoothing
perspective, if expectations are a 'free' variable. If one takes this
argument to the extreme, it becomes impossible to reject empirically the tax
smoothing model.
More generally, this model does not provide totally convincing answers
to our twoquestionson OECD economies. First, whynow?The tax smoothing
model can certainly explain why debt/GP ratios started to increase as a
result of the 1973.74 recession. Onecanalso argue that policy makers
underestimated the need for afiscaladjustment, since the rates of growth
in the decade that followed (1974-1984) were generally lower than in the
previous decade. However, it is hard to imagine that these miscalculations
alone can explain the skyrocketing debt/CNP ratios observed, for instance,
in belgium, Ireland and Italy.10 -
Second,the tax sioothing theory has verylittleto say in response to
the second question: whyincertain countries the debt/GNP ratios
increased, but not in others? Certainly, different countries ay have been
hit differently by different ihocks and their expectations of future
spending sight have been different, but with shocks and predictability of
revenues and expenditures we find it quite difficult to .xplain the variance
in the data displayed by Figures 1 and 2.
Therefore, we now move to politico-institutional approaches.
3. Fiscal illusion
The "public choice" school which flourished with the work of Buchanan,
Tullok and associates, has made the discussion of excessive deficits and
lack of fiscal discipline in modern democracies one of its central
themes .11
Itgoes beyond the scope (and the space constraints) of the present
paper to provide a detailed analytical surveyofthis literature; instead we
emphasize twocrucialideas that underlay much of the work of this school.
i) "Fiscal illusion"
ii) Asyxnetric stabilization policies.
In a nutshell, the idea of fiscal illusion is that the voters do not
understand the intertemporal budget constraint of the governrent. When
offered a deficit financed expenditure progra., they overestimate the
benefits of current expenditures and underestimate future tax burden.
JBuchanan(1959) in an iportartt paper acknowledges the intellectual
connection between the "public choice" school and the Italian school of
public finance of the nineteen century. On this intellectualconnection see
also Alesina and Tabellini (1992).- 11-
Opportunisticpoliticians who want to be reelected take advantage of this
confusion by raising spending more than taxes in order to please the
•fiscally illuded" voters. Oneofthe most forceful discussion of the
concept of "fiscal illusion" and its crucial rol. for the "public choice"
approach i* in Buchanan and Wagner (l977).,J
According to this school, Keynesianism has also contributed to
excessive deficits and the abandonment of the "responsible" budget balance
rule. Keynesian stabilization policies become asymmetric: politicians are
always willing to rundeficitsin recessions, but never willing to run
surpluses when recessions are over. The "fiscally illuded" voters do not
punish this behavior.V
These explanations of budget deficits are not totally convincing for
several theoretical and empirical reasons. First, they crucially rely on
the notion of "fiscal illusion"; without it, we do not have a theory of
persistent deficits. The problem is that this notion goes well beyond the
reasonable idea that it is very difficult for the electorate to understand
the complexity of the government budget. There is a crucial difference
between "errors" and "illusions". If voters make uncorrelated errors, on
average they do not overestimate or underestimate the costs and benefits of
taxes and spending. An "illusion" implies a systematic bias in these
errors. While it is uncontroversial that voters make mistakes and are
imperfectly informed, it is not at all obvious why the mistakes should be
L'Foran early treatment of fiscal illusion see Puviani (1903). See
also Wagner (1976).
21SeeBuchanan and Wagner (1977), and several chapters in Buchanan,
Rowley and Tollison (1986).- 12
biased in a certain direction, i.e. underestimation of the tax burden
relative to the benefits of spending.
Second1 this theory does not adequately answer the question of why
now?'. The deficit problem in the countries of Figure 1 appeared after the
early seventies and in the United States in the early eighties; Rou.bini and
Sachs (1989 a,b) argue that, up to that point, the post war experience of
the OECD countries does not reveal significant deviations from a 'tax
smoothing' policy. So, why does the 'fiscal illusion' create problems
starting in the seventies but not before?J
Third, how do we explain cross country differences? Are voters more
illuded" in certain countries than in others? Are politicians more
opportunistic in certain countries than in others?
Buchanan and Wagner (1977) suggest that different tax structures and
fiscal institutions may lead to more or less fiscal illusion. For instance.
they argue that a more complicated tax structure sends noisier signals to
the tax payers concerning the true level of the tax burden.2J However, we
are not aware of comparative studies of OECD tax structures which
establishes a link between the size of public debt and the amountoffiscal
illusion created by different institutions. Moreover, a recent empirical
paper by Peltzman (1991) casts some doubts on the argument thatthe American
voter rewards administrators who are big spenders.
1/Notethat Keynesian stabilization policies were more in vogue in the
Sixties than in the Eighties.
2.1Actually,it is not a priori obvious why a noisier signal implies a
systematic bias downward in the perception of the true tax burden.13
Anargument somewhatrelated to the •fiscal illusion" approach is put
forward in the "political business cycle" model by Nordhaus (1975). The
idea is that in election years politicians follow expansionary policies.
The voters reward the politicians without understanding (nor learning from
the past) that pre-electoral expansionary policies will have to be "paid" by
post-electoral recessions. Even though the Nordhaus' model is developed in
terms of an inflation unemployment trade-off, it can be easily applied to
budget deficits.
The literature on "political business cycles" is large and would
deserve a separate treatment.2.J The point which concerns us is that
political business cycles models are not well equipped to explain long run
trends in the debt to GNP ratios, while they can explain short term
fluctuations of spending and taxes around elections. For instance, Alesina,
Cohen and Roubini (1992, 1993) find electoral cycles on the budget in a
sample of OECD democracies. However, their magnitude is small and cannot
explain the pattern of debt/CNP ratios shown in Figure 1.
4. Interzenerational redistributions
The intertexsporal nature of fiscal decisions create links across
generations. However, if each generation cares enough about its offspring,
the finite horizon of each generation is iaterial. In particular, the
"Ricardian equivalence" result (Barro (1974)) implies that, given enough
intergenerational altruism, the choice of how to finance a given level of
spending is irrelevant.2J In particular, the distribution of tax burden
11Fora recent survey of this literature see Alesina (1993)
21Taxesare non distortionary in this model.14
across generation is not influenced by the size of the debt: changes in
public debt are coicpertsated by changes in private bequests.
In ode1s where the Ricardian equivalence does not hold, public debt
ay instead generate intergenerational redistributions, if the generation
that is alive today leaves the burden of the debt to future generations.
There is a critical difference between the current generation and future
generations (including children currently alive): only the current one
votes. Thus, in principle, a selfish generation could vote for policies
which shift the burden of taxation to the future. An obvious limit to this
behavior, is given by intergenerational altruism: parents do care about
their children.
Cukierman and Meltzer (1989) propose an interesting political model of
intergenerational redistributions. Their crucial idea can be summarized
briefly as
and poor
follows. Suppose that in the current generation we have rich"
parents: The former are individuals who plan to leave positive
bequests to their offsprings and for whom Ricardian equivalence holds:
they are indifferent to the debt policy since they can compensate any change
in current taxes and deficits with adjustments in their bequests.,J The
poor are individual who would like to leave negative bequests. Since,
however, the latter are not permitted (one cannot borrow from his
offsprings), the upoorN would like to run government deficits: as a result,
they indirectly borrow from future generations. Therefore, one group of
agents (the rich") is indifferent to any debt policy, the other group (the
poor) favors public debt. Therefore, the social choice is likely to lead
),JTa'esare lump.sum in this model.- 15-
todebt. Although Cukierman and Meltzer (1989) emphasize a social choice
reached by majority rule, even a benevolent social planner would choose to
issue debt4J
The idea that public debt redistributes in favor of the current
generation of voters, while future voters have no voice" is, in principle,
quite powerful. However, a closer inspection of it reveals thatit isnot
sufficientto provide a complete answer to our twoquestions.
First, why now? Whytheseintergenerational redistributions through
the governmentbudgethave increased so sharply in the last twentyyearsand
not before?j/ Second, why in certain countries and not in Others?Is
intergenerational altruism stronger in certain countries than in others?
Third, high public debts have often been accumulated and sharply reduced
within the lifetime of one generation (Alesina (1988)).
Fourth, why future generations (i.e. the children of today) should
honor public debt obligations ratherthan default? This point is
particularly relevant for Cukierman and Meltzer (1989), since they assume
thatnegativeprivate bequests are not enforceable, while the public
negativebequest (i.e.publicdebt) is enforceable, i.e. the public debt
cannot be defaulted.
Tabellini (1991) answersthislast criticism by arguing that
intergenerational redistributions interplay with intragenerational
LI In fact, one group of agents is indifferent to debt, while the other
benefits from it, since it removes the non negativity constraint on private
bequests.
21Notethat if growth is increasing, then it might make sense for the
current generation to shift the tax burden to the next one. However, grovth
has been, if anything, decreasing in OECD countries in the last twenty years
relative to the previous twodecades.16
redistributions. A choice of default redistributes from debt holders to tax
payers, i.e., from the 'old to the •young and from the 'rich (who hold
the debt) to the poor who do not. A •rich, young taxpayer may dislike
default, although he does not hold any debt, because he cares about the
welfare of his oldu and rich father. Thus, the uantidefault coalition
includes some of the young non debt holders because of intergenerational
altruism. Tabellini (1991) shows that, under certain conditions, the
political equilibrium implies issuing debt, which is then honored.
The interesting contribution of this paper is its emphasis on
intragenerational distribution. We shall argue below, particularly in
Section 6, that the answers to our two questions have more to do with
irttr.generational conflicts over distribution rather than with
intergenerational conflicts. However, even this paper cannot anwer the two
crucial questions: why now? and why in certain countries only?
5.Debt as a comnitment: The Strategic Role of Debt
The stock of debt links past policies to future policies. The current
policy maker can affect the state of the word" inherited by his successors
through his fiscal choices which determine the size of the debt.
Alesina and Tabellini (1990) argue that a government can take advantage
of this strategic possibility and show that this political game between
governmentsinoffice at different points in time can lead to an
accumulation of government debt beyond what prescribed by the tax
smoothing" model. The simplest illustration of this idea is as follows:
consider a twoparty systemwhere the two parties have different preferences
over the composition of public spending. For concreteness, one party likes- 17-
"defense"the other likes "social welfare". The twopartiesare
ideological, that is they represent the interests of different
constituencies: the parties want to hold office in order to implement the
desired policies.1,J Suppose that the partythatlikes "defense" iiin
office today, and the result of the next election is uncertain, because of
shocksto the electorate preferences: a fraction of the electorate
oscillate between the party of "defense' and the party of "social welfare'.
The "defense" party, in office today, spends on defense and issues debt
so that if the 'social welfare" party will be in office tomorrow, it will
have to service the debt and won't be able to spend much on welfare. By
committing future tax revenues to debt service, today's government can
reduce spending of future governments. Inother words, if the current
governmentdoes not like the spending choices of its opponent, it can
increase the utility of its constituency by issuing debt. This strategic
interaction leads to deficits even though a social planner who maximizes the
weighted average of utilities of the two groups would choose to balance the
budgetin every period.
Theamount of borrowing of today's government is larger:i) the
larger is the disagreement between the two parties, that is the more
polarized are their preferences on the composition of government spending;
ii) the more unlikely it is that today's government will be reappointed
tomorrow. Therefore, polarization of party positions and government
fragility explain debt accumulation.
LISeeWittoan (1983), Calvert (1985), Alesina (1988), and Alesina and
Rosenthal(1994) for discussions of voting models with ideological parties.18 -
Perasonand Svensson (1989) provide arelatedode1 in which the two
parties disagree not about the composition of government spending, but its
level: they consider a 'big spender' and a 'low spender'. An important
difference between the two uodels is that while Alesin.a and Tabellini (1990)
predict that every party would issue debt, Persson and Svensson (1989) do
not: only the 'low spender' does. The intuition is that by lowering taxes
and issuing debt, the low spender constrains future spending. On the other
hand, by creating surpluses the high spender encourages future spending.,J
The model by Persson and Svensson (1989) is symmetric: one party creates
deficits, the other one surpluses.
Tabellini and Alesina (1991) develop a more precise relationship
between deficits and polarization of individual preferences, rather than
party preferences. They consider a model where decisions are taken by
majority rule, and any proposal can be made and voted upon in pairwise
comparisons. Under these conditions, the 'median voter theorem" implies
that the policy adopted is the one most preferred by the median voter. 21
With uncertainty about the preferences of future majorities over the
composition of spending, the current median voter prefer to issue debt to
tilt the future composition of spending in his favor. Tabellini and Alesina
(1990) show that the amountofdebt issued is increasing in the dispersion
J Perason and Svensson's results differ according to how 'extreme'the
twopartiesare in their preferences.
2.1 This model is equivalent to one in which two parties competefor
office and only care about winning. Both parties converge to the policy
preferred by the 'median voter'; this is the 'median voter theorem" (Black
(1958), Downs (1957)).19 -
ofvoters' preferences: the more concentrated toward the extreme are the
electorate's preferences, the larger is the debt.
This class of models suffers from the same problem we pointed out in
models of intergenerational redistributions: public debt does not commit
future governments if the latter can default. Alesina and Tabellirti (1989)
address this problem in a model of anopeneconomy where the costs of
default are modelled (quite roughly) asanoutput loss. The costs of
default imply a constraint on the current government's ability to issue
debt: at most, today's government can issue an amountofdebt which makes
the next government indifferent between defaulting and servicing the debt.
This principle is quite general and should not depend on the specific
assumptions concerning the costs of default.
In all the models reviewed thus far in this section, the strategic role
of debts consist of creating facts for future governments, but the level
of debt does not influence the electoral result. Aghion and Bolton (1990),
Milesi-Ferretti (1993), and Milesi-Ferretti and Spolaore (1994) argue that
incumbent governments can use strategically public debt to influence the
election outcome, by influencing the preferences of the electorate. For
example, suppose that the party of the left is expected to be more prone to
default, since the upper class holds the largest fraction of the public
debt. Aghion andBolton(1990) show that right wing governments would
choose to issue debt in order to make a larger fraction of the population a
debt-holder, Asa result,the left, that favors default, loses support.
Milesi-Ferretti (1993) shows that the composition of debt between nominal
and indexed can be used strategically along the same lines, if the left wing- 20
party is more inflationary than the right wing one. Milesi-Ferretti and
Spolaore (1993), (1994) investigate in this context the general problem of
atrategic inefficiencies, namely when it is in the interest of a rational
incumbent to create inefficiencies on purpose and by doing so increase the
probability of reelection.
How do these strategic models face the facts? L.et us begin with the
question uwhy flOW?u.Aswe have seen, Alesina and Tabellini (1989, 1990)
and Tabellini and Alesina (1990) argue that political polarization and
frequent government changes should be associated with larger debts.J The
seventies and eighties have witnessed much more frequent changes of
governments from left to right and vice versa than the previous two decades.
In the period 1960 to 1972 (up to the first oil shock), in the OECD
economies one observes a 'significant" government change on average about
once every 10.5 years; from 1973 to 1987 about every 6.5 years. L/ Thus,
in the post 1972 period governments have been less certain of their
reappointment than the previous decades.
The OECD economies have also become much less stable in the post 1973
period: political and economic instability are likely to be strictly
LI The frequency of government changes can be taken as a very rough
indicator of uncertainty. Countries and time periods in which the same
government is repeatedly and routinely reappointed are probably cases of
relative stable and certain preferences relative to cases of frequent
changes.
21Agovernment change is de.fined as'significant' when it involves a
change in the party in office or a substantial change in the coalition (for
fnstance the enlargement of a centrist coalition to a socialist party with
non-trivial size). A minor coalition reshuffling, such as those often
occurring in three-four or five party center left coalition in Italy is not
considered significant. Data are from Alt (1985) and Alesina and Roubini
(1992) who also provide more precise definitions, and the list of 18 OECD
economies included in the sample used for these calculations.- 21
interconnected and feed upon each other (Alesina, Ozier, Roubini and Swagel
(1992) and Alesina and Perotti (1993)).
Whypublicdebts accumulate in certain countries and not in others?
The theory implies that high debt countries should have more polarized
political parties and a more polarized electorate with strong 'extreme
groups. Alestha (1989) constructs *veryrough index of political stability
for OECD countries for the seventies and eighties based on several politico
institutional characteristics.1/ The index is increasing in instability,
and the average value for the countries in Figure 1 is 3.3; the average
value for countries in Figure 2 is -0.1. This difference is large since the
highest value of the index for the countries included in the two figures is
6 and the lowest is -3.2]
Themodels reviewed in this section have also been used to explain
several specific episodes of debt accumulation. For instance. Alesina and
Tabellini (1990) interpret Reagan's deficits as a manoeuvre to constrain
future Democratic administrations' spending on social welfare.J
It is quite certain that President Clinton's budget would have been more
generous on domestic spending, if he had to face a lower interest bill.
),,JTheseare: whether or not the country has experienced one transition
from dictatorship to democracy; whether in the country one find significant
extreme right wing parties and communist parties; a measure of frequency of
government changes; whether or not the country has linguistic or regional
conflicts; whether elections can be called by the executive, or their timing
is fixed by the constitution; the average size of coalitions.
VIrelandis not included in these calculations because the instability
index is not available for this country.
On January 25, 1987 in an op-ed article of the New York Times one
could read that Nthe deficit is not a despised orphan. It is President
Reagan's child, and secretly he loves it, as David Stockman has explained:
the deficit rigorously discourages any idea of spending another dime on
social we1fare.- 22-
Ferssonand Svensson (1989) have argued that their model explain the
Reagan'sdeficitsand the Swedish experience of the conservative government
of 1976.82. Aghion and golton's (1990) model can alsoexplainepisodesof
deficits under conservative governments.
In auary, the class of models reviewed in this section suggests a
relationship between the nature of party competition, polarization of
preferences and electoral uncertainty. These are variables which can be
measured and do vary across countries and time periods. Therefore, these
models are testable and, in principle, can provide answers to the question
of "why now?" and "why in certain countries?". However, the empirical work
based upon these models has, thus far, been sketchy, and at most, suggestive
rather than conclusive. Nevertheless, these fragments of evidence suggest
that these models may in fact go in the right direction.
6. Distributional conflicts and wars of attrition
The models discussed in the previous section emphasize a strategic
interaction between political parties in office at different points in time.
In this section we review models in which deficits are the results of
strategic conflicts between political parties or social groups that have an
influence at the same time on policy decisions. For instance, while before
we focused on the conflict and the ideological polarization between parties
which alternate in single-party governments, here we are concerned with the
polarization of parties members of the same coalition government.
Alesina and Drazen (1991) propose a war of attrition model of delayed
fiscal adjustments in which different socio-political groups fight about the
distribution of the fiscal burden. The model assumes that a permanent shock- 23
perturbs the government budget, so that at the existing tax rates, a deficit
appears and the debt begins to accumulate. A social planner would react
immediately to this shock and raise tax revenues in order to keep abalanced
budget.].J The point of the model iithatthe distributional struggle
amongst social groups delays the adoption of the efficient policy of
balancing the budget.
More specifically, when the deficit appears, it is financed partly by
external debt accumulation and partly by some form of highly
distortionary taxation, for instance seignorage. A stabilization is defined
as a change of policy which stabilizes the debt/CNP ratio and substitutes
the pre-stabilization taxation with a less distortionary regular form of
taxation.
Suppose that twogroupshave to decide on how to share the fiscal
burden of the stabilization.j The longer they wait the higher are the
costs, for two reasons: the pre-stabilization fiscal distortions persist
over time; the debt accumulates, so that higher taxes are needed to service
it after the stabilization. An immediate agreement on how to share the
fiscal burden of stabilization makes both groups better off relative to the
same agreement reached with delay. However, rational delays occurs under
twoconditions:1) the proposed stabilization is aunequitablew, namely one
group has to bear a disproportionate share of the fiscal burden; 2) the two
jjFor simplicity and clarity of exposition, this model implies that the
optimal tax smoothing policy implies a permanently balanced budget.
21Withsome modification in the notation and in the model construction,
the analysis can be applied to the case of domestic debt.
JWithsome complications, the model can be extended to more than two
groups.- 24-
groupsare not informed about the other's strengths; that is, each group
does not knowhowcostly it is for the other to postpone the
stab ilization .2/
Thesecosts can be interpreted in twononmutually exclusive ways: one
emphasizes the economic costs of the pre-stabilization distortions, the
other emphasizes the political costs of preventing the other group from
imposing an undesirable fiscal plan. Political costs include lobbying cost,
or costs of direct political action.
The looser' is the group which will have to pay the larger share of
the fiscal stabilization; the Mwinner is the other one. Generally, both
groups will not accept to be the looser immediately: they hope that the
other group will concede first. The optimal concession time is determined
by equating the marginal cost of waiting with the marginal benefit of
waiting. The marginal cost is the utility cost of living another instant in
the unstable and distorted economy. The marginal benefit is given by the
conditional probability that the other group will concede in the next
instant multiplied by the difference in utility between being the winner"
and the looseru, i.e. between paying the lower or the higher share of the
fiscal burden.
The more unequal is the distribution of the stabilization coSts,
the later is the expected time of stabilization. The intuition is clear:
the more unequal is the burden of stabilization. ceteris Daribus the higher
are the benefits from holding in". Furthermore, the lower are the costs of
.JTheoriginal model of war of attrition in a biological context was
formalized by Riley (1980). Bliss and Nalebuff (1984) further developed it.
Forapplications of this model to labor strike see Kerman and Wilson (1989).- 25
living in an unstable economy. ceteris paribus, the later is the
stabilization. This result has twointerpretations:first it suggests that
.conomic mechanisms, such as indexation clauses, which reduce the cost of
macroeconomic instability tend to postpone adjustments; second, political
mechanisms which make it easier and less costly to exercise a veto power and
"block" proposed stabilization plans, delay stabilization.
Drazen and Crilli (1993) extend this model by showing that an economic
crisis may anticipate the stabilization by forcing a "solution" to the war
of attrition. The idea is that an increase in the pre-stabilization costs
due to a crisis makes it so costly to continue the war of attrition, that
one group concedes. Thus, an economic emergency can, in the end, be
socially beneficial: on the one hand it causes an economic crisis with its
costs; on the other hand it shortens the delay in the adoption of the
necessary stabilization.L/
Spolaore (1993) applies war of attrition models to coalition
governments. He considers fiscal shocks which create budget deficits. Given
these shocks, a social planner would follow the optimal policy which is
modelled as a function of the costs of adjustment and the persistence of the
shock. Spolaore (1993) takes this optimal policy as a benchmark and shows
that a coalition government delays adjustment, while a single party
government reacts "tOo much", relative to what a social planner would do.
This result arises because different parties represent the interest of
different constituencies and each of them would like to be spared from
21Drazenand Grilli (1993) note that Hirschman (1985) made a similar
argument informally, but their paper is the first rigorous formalization of
these ideas.- 26-
taxes.A coalition government delays the fiscal adjustment until the veto
power game amongst coalition members is resolved;J asa result,a
coalition government does not adjust as often and as muchasa social
planner would do. On the contrary, a single party government overreact to
the fiscal shock, since it underestimates the social costs of adjustment.
In fact, its constituency can be protectedN so that it does not bear any
cost. Spolaore (1993) also shows that the inefficiencies in policy
reactions in a coalition government is increasing in the number of coalition
members.
In summary, this line of research relates the accumulation of public
debt to the fragmentation of governments and to the degree of political
cohesion. Lass cohesion implies more difficulties in achieving an agreement
on an equitable distribution of the costs of fiscal adjustment. and,
therefore, to longer delays in stopping the growth of debt. Furthermore,
political institutions and electoral laws leading to the formation of
coalition governments, should be associated with higher deficits than single
party governments.
How do these models answer our two questions? First, the question of
why now? War of attrition models explain why countries delay adjustments to
shock, and, therefore, can explain the procrastination of fiscal
adjustments. However, these models do not explain the cause of the original
shock which perturbated he fiscal balance. Roubini and Sachs (1989 a,b)
show that until the first oil shock, by and large the OECD economies had
21UnlikeAlesina and Drazen (1991) Spo].aore (1993) does not rely on
asymmetric information but on randomization to obtain delays.27 -
followedfiscal policies empirically undistinguishable from the ta.x
smoothing" model. After the oil shock, certain countries let their
government debt explode by delaying the adjustment. Von Ragen (1992) also
notes that the cross country variability of fiscal performance greatly
increased after the first oil shock, relative to the previous decade. Thus,
these results suggest that different institutions have to explain different
responses to a common shock, rather than the shock itself.
Whycertaincountries and not others? Weak coalition governments have
typically postponed fiscal adjustments and have accumulated debt. Roubini
and Sachs (1989 a,b) construct a political indicator which assume increasing
values as government fragmentation increases. They show that, after
controlling for several economic determinants of budget deficits, (suggested
by the "tax smoothing" model) their political variable is highly
significant: the higher the number of parties in a coalition government,
the higher is public debt.
Crilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) also show that budget deficits
are correlated with government durability: longer lived governments have
smaller deficits. This finding is consistent with the previous one, since
coalition governments typically have shorter lives than single party
governments.
The nature of party systems and of government structure depends on the
electoral system. For instance, proportional, representational electoral
systems typically create multiparty systems and coalition governments; on
the contrary, majoritarian systems lead to single party governments, as





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































representational systems characterized by coalition governments (Figure 7).
Therefore, one can suggest a relationship between the type of electoral
system and the level of debt. This observation certainly fits the cases of
Belgium, Ireland, and Italy, the three countries with the largest debt/CNP
ratios in the OECD.
The American version of coalition government is the relatively common
situation of divided government, i.e. the case in which the same party does
not hold the Presidency and a majority in the House and in the Senate 4J
Awidely held view, both in the popular press and in academia
is thatdividedgovernment in the Eighties was responsible for the build up
of American deficits.V The problem with this argument is that divided
government is not a novelty of the Eighties: it ocurred often in the past.
On the other hand, the Eighties are a rather unique example of peacetime,
non recessionary build up of debt. In other words, why divided government
in previous decades did not create the same deficits as in the Eighties?J
Furthermore, the root of the American deficits are in the 1981/1982 fiscal
policies: these were the two years with the most unified Republican control
of the decade.
11Fora more extended discussion of similarities and differences between
divided government in the United States and coalition governments in Europe
see Alesina and Rosenthal (1994), Chapter 10, Fiorina (1991) and Layer and
Shepsle (1991).
2/See,for instance, McCubbins (1991) and the criticism by Barro (1991).
JMcCubbins (1991) argues that what matters is not the division between
the President of one party and a Congress with a majority of the other
party, but division between Senate and House. The latter case, which
occurred from 1.981 to 1986 is much less common. However, Mc Cubbins'
argument still relies essentially on one observation.29 -
Poterba(1992) and Alt andLowry(1992) present evidence on the effect
of divided government by looking at Arerican states. They consider the
policy response to fiscal shocks and find that the adjustment is slower in
stateswithdivided control than in states with unified control. Their
results are remarkably similar to those by Roubini and Sachs (1989 sb) on
OECD economies: in both cases coalition or divided government do not create
budget deficits, but procrastinate the adjustment to shocks.
In summary, the models surveyedinthe section are quite successful at
establishing links between institutional features and party structure and
budget deficits. The empirical evidence is quite encouraging for these
models, perhaps more than for the somewhat related approach of the previous
section. Finally, note that institutions such as electoral systems, are
themselves endogenous. They do change overtime, although infrequentlyiJ.
and are chosen asaresult of socio.political conflicts of interests. Thus,
the researcher faces a challenging questions: to what extent can we take
institutions as exogenous in explaining deficit biases?
7.Ceorathica11v disDersed interests
A large literature in political science has studied how the
organization of legislatures lead to inefficient fiscal decisions.2J
Although this research focuses on the United States Congress. its
implications are broader: for the purpose of our paper, we focus on models
J New Zealand and Italy are, for instance, in the midst of sweeping
electoral reforms.
21 See for instance Ferejohn (1974),Fiorina and Noll (1978), Shepsle and
Weingast(1981), Weingast, Shepsie and .Johnsen (1981), Baron and Ferejohn
(1989).30 -
wherethegeographicbase of metbers of congress leads to "excessive"
spending.
Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981) argue that representativeswith a
geographically based constituency overestimate the benefitsof public
projects in their districts, relative to the costsof financing it, which
ar. distributed nationwide. The aggregate effectof rational
representatives facing these incentives is an oversupply of geographically
based public projects. Specifically, the size of the budget is largerwith
N legislators elected in N districts than with a single legislator elected
nationwide and the budget size is increasing in N, the numberof districts.
Thekey intuition is that the voters of district I receivebenefits equal to
Efora project but have to pay 1/Nofthe total costs, if taxes are
equally distributed amongst districts. A geographically based
representative does not internalize the effect of its proposals onthe tax
burden of the nation.
Thesemodels typically explain the size of budget, in particular of
expenditures on "pork barrel" projects: therefore they do not directly
address the problem of budget deficits. However, these models can
potentially be very useful for our questions as well, if they areextended
in twoioportantdirections.
First, they should become dynamic,inorder to be capable of addressing
not only the issue of the j.j of the budget, but also its balance.Is it
the case that geographically elected representatives have an incentive to
run deficits relative to representatives elected nationwide?The second
issue to be reconsidered is that the share of OECD country budgetsdevoted31
to pork barrel projects is shrinking, relative to the share of transfer
programs and entitlements. To be sure, some of the transfer programs have
geographically based constituencies. For example, Florida has ahigh
concentration of old age pensions; invalidity pensions have been used as a
transfer system from Northern to Southern Italy.j/ These are cases in
which income redistribution and geographical redistribution become highly
interconnected. However, strictly defined pork barrel projects are only a
relatively small part of current budget problems in OECD economies. It is
hard to imagine that substantial fiscal adjustment programs in OECD
economies can take place without affecting transfer and social security
programs. Models of geographically dispersed interests are not well equipped
at handling these issues.
The crucial insight of this literature is, nevertheless, important:
the geographical distribution of costs, benefits, and decision power can
make much difference for the aggregate budget. In particular, one can think
of an analogy between some issues of fiscal federalism and the model by
Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981). Suppose that spending decisions are
taken at the local level, and are financed with transfers by the national
government that raises taxes. The same mechanism operates in this case, as
for the case of geographically elected representatives. The local
authorities do not fully internalize the effects of their spending decisions
over the overall budget for the same reasons why the geographically elected
representatives don't. Clearly, the incentives for the local authorities
),j Emerson (1988) reports that in 1984 the ratio of invalidity pensions
over old age pensions in Italy was about 40 per cent and it was 250% in
Southern Italy and 669% in the Sicilian province of Enna.32
are different if they are responsible for both taxing i spening
decisions.),!
The di.cussion of federalis hasrecentlypicked up ooentu,bothin
the United States and Europe.2.J Fiscal arrangerents linking the center to
local authorities vary greatly across countries. Furtherore, Hughes and
Smith (1991) suggest that from 1975 to the late eighties on can detect an
increase in the fiscal responsibilities of local authorities. Whether or
not this cross countryandtemporal variation of federalist arrangeoents can
explain budget deficits is still an open question.V This is an important
topic for future research.
B. Budetar'q institutions
Budgetary institutions are all the rules and regulations according to
which budgets are drafted, approved andipletented.These rules greatly
varyacrosscountries, thus they can potentially explain cross country
variationsin deficits and debts.
Budget institutions have an effect on fiscal policy outcomes if two
conditionshold.
i)Budget institutions are more difficultto change (de iure or ude
factow) than the budget law itself.
ii) Budget institutions influence the final vote and the ip1eentation of
the budget.
),j Different federalist arrangements can have important implication for
fiscal redistributions (Perotti (1992)) and fiscal stabilizations (Perason
and Tabellini (1993)).
Z/Seethe recent survey byHughes and Smith (c9l) and the references
cited therein.
JFora fragment ofevidence along this line see the comments by
Tabellini on Hughes and Smith (1991).- 33
Both conditions are met in the world, at least up to a point. Budget
institutions change rater infrequently; even though they £ifl be changed when
they do not satisfy the needs of a community. L/Thecrucial issue,
however, is that budget institutions cannot be changed as easily and
frequently as the budget itself: otherwise they would be totally
ineffective.
Whether or not institutions actually affect the final outcome of a
legislative vote (and its implementation) is a major outcome in the research
agenda of modern political science. Shepsie (1979 a,b) shows that the
structure" imposed by certain procedural institutions helps solving the
Arrow's impossibility problem in legislatures.2J For instance, a key
issue is who holds the agenda setting power and what types of a.mendiLents are
adzissible in the legislature floor: generally speaking, the theory
suggests that procedural rules which limit universalism and reciprocity are
conducive to fiscal restraint. "Universalism" is defined as the property of
a budget to include something for everybody. Reciprocity" is an agreement
not to oppose another representative's proposal in exchange for the sane
favor in return. As for the case of the models of the previous section,
research in this area has an American focus, and virtually all the formal
models are more directly applicable to explain the of the budget.
11TheCongressional Budget Act of 1974 in the United States is an
exaple of a major reform of budgetary institutions.
21Formore specific application to the budget process see Ferejohn and
Krehbiel (1987), Ferejohn, Fiorina and MeKelvey (1987), Baron and Ferejohn
(1989), Baron (1991), and Weingast and Marshall (1985).34 -
ratherthan the intertemporal allocation of spending and taxation (i.e. the
budget balance) .1.1
Arecent paper by Von Hagen (1992) uses this approach to answer our two
questionsconcerning budget deficits, by focusing on the budgetary
institutions of the twelve members of the EEC. He tests an interesting
ustructural hypothesis, namely that: 'budget procedures lead to greater
fiscal discipline if they give strong prerogative to the prime minister or
the finance minister, if they limit universalism, reciprocity and
parliamentary amendments and facilitate strict execution of the budget law".
Von Hagen consturcts indices which summarize several budgetary
institutions. The most comprehensive index used in this study includes
classifications of countries as a function of: i) the strength of the
position of the prime minister (or finance minister) in intra-government
negotiations; ii) the limits (or lack thereof) to parliamentary amendments;
iii) the type of parliamentary votes (item by item, global etc.); iv) the
timing of parliamentary votes; v) the degree of transparency of the budget;
vi) the amount of flexibility in the implementation process.
The classification of countries according to these criteria inevitably
requires some judgment calls, particularly since the author attempts to
capture "de facto" procedures, beyond the letter of the law. Nevertheless,
the strong support which be finds for the structural hypothesis" is
convincing. In particular, he finds that several related indices of
budgetary institution are significant explanatory variable for cross country
2,1 For a more comparative approach see Wildavsky (1986) and the reference
cited therein.35 -
differencesin the debt/CNP ratios and budget deficits in the eighties in
the EEC; the •structural hypothesis' receives rather strong support.
Von Hagen's institutional data are quite rich and worth further
exploration. For instance, these aggregate indices, 'squeeze In' many
institutional differences. A comparison between two fiscally responsible'
countries, France and C.rmany, illustrates the point. France has a very
high indexj/ due to its voting rules and the role of the Prime Minister.
Germany's voting rules are actually amongst the least compatible (at least
on paper) with fiscal responsibility, however Germany also has a high index
because of budget transparency and inflexibility in the implementation.2/
That is, one find much variability of institutional arrangements, even
within countries with the same aggregate index.J
American states are a second example on which one can test the idea
that 'budgetary institutions matter". American states have a variety of
different arrangements concerning their budget; in addition to different
procedures for budget formation, some states have "hard" budget balance
rules, other have 'soft" budget balance rules and a few have no such rules.
It is commonly argued that state legislatures find more or less 'creative"
ways to circumvent these rulesJ; however, three recent quantitative
L/ The indices are defined as increasing with the structural hypothesis.
21 In fact, in variations of the basic index in which these two
characteristics are not considered, Germany's rank drops a few position.
J Von Hagen (1992) also tests less successfully another hypothesis,
focusing on the existence of long term (i.e. multi year) budget plans. This
hypothesis is harder to test and the proposed indices probably relies too
heavily on the existence of long term budget proposals which are not truly
binding. See Tanzi (1991) for a discussion of the perverse effect of non
credible long term budget plans.
J For a recent discussion of this point see Alt and Lowry (1992) and
Poterba (1992).36
empirical papers make the point that budget rules do make some difference,
even though, probably not asmuchastheletter of the lawwouldimply.
Von Ragen (1991), concludes that budget rules have some affect on the level
and composition of state debts. Alt and Lowry (1992) and Poterba (1992)
argue that Anerican states with Tharder" balance budget rules react more
promptly and more energetically to negative revenue shocks or positive
spending shocks.
In sunmary,thecrucial message of this research is that budgetary
institutions influence fiscal policies. Does this insight contribute to
answer our two questions? Institutional differences can certainly
contribute to answer our second question: why in certain countries and not
in others?
As for the first question, (why now?) there might be more of a problem.
As Von Hagen (1992) notes, budgetary institutions are relatively stable over
time. Thus, how can we explain the sharp increase in the cross country
variance of fiscal performances in the seventies and eighties, relative to
the two previous decades?
One possible answer is to consider the effect of economic shocks in
different budgetary institutions, along the same line of "var of attrition
models. Perhaps the consequences of budgetary institutions not adequate to
enforce fiscal responsibility have a particularly negative impact in periods
in which fiscal adjustments are needed. In our view, this is a very
promising avenue to explore further with careful comparative empirical work.37 -
9. Policy imDlieations
The policy implications of the political economy literature are
particularly relevant for institutional reforms. If policy outcomes are
influenced by politico-institutional variables1 then in order to improve
policy making one has to intervene attheinstitutional level. Several OECD
economies are struggling with fiscal adjustment programs and fiscal
reforms. Former planned economies are in the process of building new fiscal
institutions, andthepolicy advisor has to deal with institutional
questions .J.J
One can think of two types of institutional reforms: 1) changes in the
legislation directly regulating the budget formation; 2) more general
institutional reforms, such aschangesin electoral laws.
8.1 The budget formation
1) 3alanced budget
One of the most commonly advocated reforms of the budget process is the
introduction of a balanced budget law, or more generally, of regulations
whichlimitthe discretionality of each government in runningdeficits.V
The"tax smoothing" theory implies that, in general, a balanced budget
policy is suboptimal. However, we have also argued that this theory is not
acompletely accurate description of actual fiscal policies. Thus, two
questions arise:
a)is asub-optimal budget balanced policy superior or inferior to the sub-
optimal policy obtained without the balanced budget law?
21 On this point see Tanzi (1992, l993b).
21 For instance, Euchanan and Wagner (1977).- 38
b) How can one make abalancedbudget law enforceable?
The first question is difficult, since it involves comparisons of •second
best" outcomes. Generally, the larger are the "politically induced"
inefficiencies, the more attractive is the option of a balanced budget law.
For instance, if it is true that proportional electoral systems with
coalition governments are more likely to procrastinate budget adjustments,
than a balanced budget law is particularly appropriate in these systems.
The costs of a balanced budget law are the loss of fiscal
stabilizations over the cycle, and the loss of flexibility in reacting to
shocks on expenditure or revenues. In theory, these problems could be
overcome by a "contingent" rule; for instance a "cyclically adjusted"
balance budget rule. However, the more complicated is the rule,the harder
it is to enforce it.J
Balanced budget laws may also be more or less desirable at different
"levels" of the public administrations. For instance, most American states
have some form of a balanced budget rule, and, as argued above, these rules
are somewhat effective in enforcing fiscal adjustments (Poterba (1992)). On
the contrary, no such rules exist at the Federal level. Restrictions on
public borrowing probably came about as a response to the 19th century
defaults (Ratchford (1941)); however, this asymmetry between the state level
and the Federal level can be rationalized by a higher value of discretion at
the federal level: expenditures and revenue at the state level may be
easier to predict than those of the federal level. On the other hand, it is
L'Foradiscussionof this point see Tanzi (1993a).39 -
anopen question at what level one should conduct stabilization
policies .1/
Thequestion of enforceability of a balanced budget law is also quite
cowplex. Anylawcan be changed by asovereign,even though certain laws
are more difficult to change than others. For instance, a constitutional
amendmentistypically the most difficult law to change, since it requires
the most complex procedures and the highest qualified majorities in the
legislature. This is why the most enthusiastic supporters of balanced
budget rules favor this institutional solution.
The procedural choice runsintothe usual trade-off between commitments
and flexibility: by making it very difficult to change the law, one makes
commitments more credible, but reduces the possibility of reacting to
unforeseen shocks. Tabellini and Alesina (1990) show that in their model
even though behind a veil of ignorance" everybody would favor a balanced
budget rule, the same rule is not enforceable if it can be changed by simple
majority rule, after the "veil of ignorance" is removed. The idea is that
when a certain government, expression of a certain majority, is in office,
it has an incentive to break the balanced budget rule and impose it on
future governments. By doing so, the current government achieves the
flexibility needed to favor its constituency and leaves the costs of debt
the constraint of the balance budget law on its successor. Thus, if the
balance budget rule can be broken by simple majority and the government
commands this majority, than the rule is not credible.
1/OnthispointseePersson and Tabellini (1993).40
By increasing the sizeofthe majority needed to break the rule,one
gains credibility but loses flexibility. A challenging normative problem is
todecide what ii the optimal qualified majority that has to be required to
abandon the balanced budget. This majority requirement should be increasing
with the politico-economic forces which increasetheincentive to run
deficits. (as discussed in the previous sections), increasing in the
predictability of expenditures and revenues,anddecreasing in the benefits
of fiscal stabilizations.
ii) Procedures for budeet avDroval
War of attrition models suggest that by limiting the uveto powerN of
players involved in the budget fornation. onereducesdelays in fiscal
adjustments and enforces fiscal responsibility.
A first war of attrition" may be played within the government a.mongst
spending ministers at the stage of budget formulation; this is most likely
to happen in coalition governments where different ministers belong to
different parties, but it may also happen otherwise. Spending ministers are
more likely to be sensitive to special interest pressures than thePrime
Minister or the Finance Minister: the latter are (or should be) more
sensitive to the overall size and financing of the budget. The effect of
intergovernmental wars of attrition are reduced if either the Prime
Minister, (or the Finance Minister has a "strong" role in the budget
formation process. Procedures which make a Prime Minister "strong" are
those that limit the "veto power" of spending ministers.
A second stage where "wars of attrition" may take place and special
interests can endanger fiscal responsibility is in the process of41
legislativeapproval of the budget. Procedures that: i) limit the typeof
sdissible aisendents; ii) impose first avoteon the size of total
spending and .thadiscussionof specific items, are more likely to limit
deficits.L/ By voting first on the overall size of the budget andthe
balance,one avoids the likely outcome of a reconciliation of conflicting
spendingneeds with an increase in the deficits.
iii) Central Bank indet'endence
Severalauthors have highlightedthesuperior achievements of
independentCentral Banks onthe inflation front.j/ Independent Central
Banksay also enforcefiscal responsibility by limiting the governments'
access to seignorage asacore or less hidden" tax.J
With an independent Central Bank, deficits haveto be bondfinanced;
thisleads to an increase inthedebt/CNP ratio and, possibly, higher
interestrates. In otherwords, the government faces a "harder" budget
constrain.
8.2.Electoral reforms
New Zealand is moving toward a more proportional electoral system,
while Italy is moving in the opposite direction. Eastern European countries
and former soviet republics had to choose (or are in the process of
choosing)electoral laws. These decisions may have important fiscal
L/Theempirical results of Von Hagen(1992) bring support tothese
views. For more theoretical discussion see, however, Ferejohn and Krehbiel
(1987).
21Forinstance, Alesina and Summers (1993), Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti
(1992),andCrilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991). JFora formalization of this argument see Tabellini (1987).- 42
consequences, and in somecases(e.e. Italy) fiscal imbalances are one of
the motivations that lead to widespread dissatisfaction with the existing
law.
As almost always in economics one faces a trade-off. Proportional
electoral systems lead to coalitions and fiscal deadlocks which delays
stabilizations. Majoritarian systems, by concentrating power in a single
party, avoid deadlocks but may create excessive variability of policies,
since the party in office is not "moderated" by coalition partners .1/
Howshould one choose on this trade-off? The literature reviewed here
provides some partial answers to this question. For instance, countries
with a very polarized distribution of preferences, (perhaps related to
income distribution) may need more proportional electoral systems to avoid
extreme policy variability, due to changes in governments with "extreme"
positions. On the other hand, in periods of economic crisis or transition
coalition governments may be an obstacle to the much needed swift policy
action.
Clearly, electoral laws cannot be changed very frequently, thus
countries have to make a relatively "permanent" choice over this trade off.
Generally speaking, choices towards the "extremes" of this trade off are
unlikely to be optimal. As for the budget deficits, a mistake towards
excessiveproportionalrepresentation is likely to have more negative
consequences that the opposite mistake. This isparticularlytrue if
jJForan interesting formalization of these ideas see Spolaore (1993).
For a discussion of policy moderation in coalition government seeAlesina
andRosenthal(1994). See Tabellthi and Alesina (1990) for some results on
therelationship between the distribution ofvoter preferences and policy
variability.- 43-
proportionalelectoral systems are accompanied by budgetary institutions
which are not likely to enforce discipline; for instance, a "weak Price
Minister in the cabinet, or unliiited amendnents in the legislature.- 44-
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